Optimal Portfolio Choice over the Life-Cycle with Flexible Work, Endogenous Retirement, and Lifetime Payouts Previous research on portfolio choice and retirement patterns has evolved from three sources. First, the finance literature has investigated how investors save and allocate their portfolios across available capital market assets, typically safe bonds and risky stocks.
1 Yet most of these studies are silent on the links between labor supply and investment behavior.
Second, a large public finance literature has explored how older people alter their work patterns in response to system retirement incentives, but that research devotes little attention to saving and portfolio allocation patterns. 2 And third, the longevity risk literature has examined how annuity payout products can help protect against outliving one"s income, 3 but it has not yet explored how flexible labor supply might shape portfolio allocation and location decisions. The present paper seeks to unify these three strands in a model which integrates the decisionmaking process of a consumer seeking to optimally select her saving, consumption, work hours, retirement age, and investment patterns in a life cycle context, where she has access to both the capital market (stocks and bonds) and annuities.
We contribute to the finance and pension literature by making the work/retirement decisions endogenous, as the consumer can adjust both her retirement date and her employment hours during her worklife. We also add value to the Social Security literature by making investment and annuitization decisions endogenous to the lifecycle work and retirement choice. From an individual"s asset-liability perspective, we show how stochastic equity returns, uninsurable labor income shocks, and uncertain lifetimes help shape investment portfolio patterns. This is not the first analysis that makes labor supply endogenous over the life cycle in an investment context, 4 but we extend prior research by integrating flexible work hours and retirement ages with uncertain mortality and uninsurable labor income paths to show how these influence consumption, saving, and portfolio choice paths. Using our realistically calibrated life cycle model, we derive optimal work and retirement behavior as well as consumption and investment patterns over stocks, bonds, and payout annuities. Prior finance studies have assumed fixed retirement ages and predict that older people hold unrealistically high levels of equity; by contrast, we show that making labor supply endogenous and allowing purchase of payout annuities substantially increases work effort of the young and reduces equity share at older ages, compatible with real-world evidence. We then illustrate how introducing annuities generates even more realistic models which permit earlier retirement and higher financial market participation by the elderly. Incorporating an agedependent leisure preference parameter is particularly interesting, as it generates a gradual decline in work hours and equity holdings with age, and a sensible dispersion in retirement ages which peak at age 62; these results are also consistent with observed data. 5 Our work draws on the portfolio choice, Social Security, and longevity risk management literatures. Many older finance studies assume that investors construct their portfolios independent of labor market influences, though a few authors do allow uninsurable labor income risk to shape household optimal consumption and investment decisions (Heaton and Lucas 1997; Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005) . These show how the optimal portfolio equity share falls with age due to the bond-like path of labor market earnings. Nevertheless those authors maintain the exogeneity of labor supply. A few studies 6 have embedded flexible work hours into a continuous time portfolio choice model, but they assume unrealistically that workers can fully insure labor income risk in the capital market (i.e. that wages are perfectly correlated with a set of traded risky securities). A recent paper by Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) analyzes endogenous work hours over the life cycle in a realistically calibrated portfolio choice discrete time model, but it requires the worker to mandatorily retire at a pre-specified age. Prohibiting consumers from controlling their retirement age is problematic, since working longer represents a key way in which older workers can react to unlucky shocks in labor and capital markets (Mitchell and Fields 1984) .
In addition, deciding when to retire and claim one"s Social Security benefits is one of the most important yet irreversible financial decisions that people make. Particularly in the current bear market of the global financial crisis, households may be able to hedge adverse capital market developments by increasing their work effort and by working longer. Our model provides new sights into the interactions between the labor income, capital and annuity market, as well as the retirement decision. When people can adjust work hours and retirement flexibly and access annuity markets, they respond to negative labor market shocks and high stock returns by working less while young, buying more annuities, and retiring early.
A large literature in the public finance arena explores how consumption, saving, and work patterns respond to Social Security benefit incentives, but those studies do not devote much attention to portfolio investment behavior. Instead, that research focuses carefully on the way in which Social Security benefits depend on and/or influence retirement behavior. For instance, Laitner (2003) analyzes the effects of Social Security taxes and benefits on retirement ages, and Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) offer an important empirical analysis of retirement patterns. 7 Low (2005) and French (2005) investigate optimal consumption, saving, and labor supply patterns with stochastic and unspanned wages, but they abstract from the portfolio allocation problem.
A last research strand on which we build analyzes the impact of longevity risk on life cycle portfolio management. This analysis demonstrates how investors chose between stocks, bonds, and survival-contingent payout streams or payout annuities, so as to optimize their saving and consumption patterns during retirement. 8 Two studies integrate annuities into a realistically calibrated portfolio choice model (uninsurable labor income, uncertain life time, stochastic capital markets, borrowing constraints) over the full life cycle, but they do not endogenize the work hours or the retirement decision (Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos 2009; Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos 2008) . Those authors demonstrate that annuities are valuable in that they offer investors the opportunity to give up liquidity in exchange for a survival-contingent premium known as the "survival credit." What remains to be done is to develop a realistically calibrated model with uninsurable labor income, uncertain asset returns, stochastic mortality, flexible hours, choice of retirement date, and variable as well as fixed annuities in the portfolio choice set. To this task we turn next.
The Consumer's Life Cycle Problem

Preferences
We employ a discrete time model   1 ,..., 0   T t , where t refers to the individual's adult age (computed as actual age minus 19 assuming the relevant lifespan starts at age 20).
The individual has an uncertain lifespan and may live for a maximum of T years (indexed from 1 to T). The parameter s t p denotes the (subjective) probability of surviving to period t + 1, given the consumer is alive at t. In the last period, s T p 1  is equal to zero. Individual preferences are characterized by an iso-eleastic and time-separable CRRA utility function
defined over a single non-durable consumption good and leisure, 7 Other studies focus on the empirical analysis of retirement patterns; see Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva (2000) and Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2008) . 8 See Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009), Milevsky, Moore, and Young (2006) , and Milevsky and Young (2007) ; a broad literature review appears in Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008) .
where the substitution between leisure and consumption takes the Cobb-Douglas form.
9
The recursive definition of the value function is given by:
with terminal utility
The parameter is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and  < 1 is the subjective time preference measuring the desirability of substituting future for current consumption/leisure. 10 Below we work with a fixed value for α, but in sensitivity analysis we also permit α to be age-dependent, so declining health at older ages may induce a lower valuation of leisure (c.f. Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva 2000) . Also in the base case, we abstract from bequest motives, but in the sensitivity analysis we incorporate in the utility function an individual"s willingness to bequeath wealth to her descendants on her death. 11
Labor and Retirement Income
Our model accounts for a flexible retirement age within the parameters generally adopted by the US Social Security system. That is, the worker can retire (consume full leisure) between the "early" retirement age (ERA; set here to age 62) and the "latest" retirement age (LRA; set here to age 70 Low (2005) uses this same formulation but his analysis of work patterns prior to retirement is silent on portfolio choices. In sensitivity analysis below, we also evaluate the trade-off between leisure and consumption using a modified Cobb-Douglas preference function as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) . 10 In the special case where α is zero, this is consistent with the conventional utility function used in many prior studies of life cycle portfolio allocation (c.f. Campbell and Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005; Viceira 2001; and Yao and Zhang 2005) . 11 Empirical evidence regarding the strength of the bequest motive is mixed. Hurd (1989) 
where   t w is a deterministic function of wage rates with respect to age allowing for the empirically observed hump-shaped earnings profile. After retirement, the household receives after-tax benefits payments from Social Security defined as follows:
where
, where ζ is the Social Security replacement rate based on lifetime average earnings, and the normal retirement age is the NRA. Average lifetime earnings level is approximated by 
Capital and Payout Annuity Market Parameters
The individual may access capital markets by investing in two different asset classes:
riskless bonds and risky stocks. The real bond gross return is constant over time and denoted by R f . The real gross risky stock return at time t is labeled R t and evolves according to a geometric random walk with drift. This implies that the log-returns for stocks ln(R t ) are serially independent and identically normally distributed with mean µs and standard deviation σ s . The return on assets is taxed according to the proportional rate t c applied to all asset income. We also include in the investment opportunity set variable payout life annuities where the payouts may reflect an underlying portfolio of equities or bonds (or both). These are insurance contracts between an annuitant and an insurer where the purchaser pays the insurer an initial premium A t and receives a pre-specified number of fund units n t for life, conditional on survival. This is computed according to: ; it may be thought of as the pre-determined shrinkage rate for the number of fund units. 14 We abstract from other institutional aspects of Social Security rules such as the earnings test for retirees who return to work after retirement. The process describing the value of the fund unit is as follows:
is the growth rate of the asset underlying the fund, and where a t  is the stock fraction chosen inside the variable annuity at time t. The equation describing the evolution of payouts for a specific annuity may be recursively written as:  =0) and the AIR is set equal to the riskless interest rate (i.e. 1 + AIR = R f ).
Wealth Transition and Optimization
Each period, the individual decides how to allocate her cash on hand W t , to bonds Bt, stocks St, payout annuities A t , and consumption Ct. The budget constraint becomes:
(7) With this investment and consumption strategy, next period"s wealth Wt+1 is given by:
where P t+1 is the sum of annuity payments received from all previously-purchased annuities. Here Y t+1 , which below we call labor income, is defined in equations (2) and (3) as labor earnings prior to retirement, and Social Security benefits after retirement. The recursive evolution equation for the sum of after-tax payouts from all previous annuities purchased can be written as:
15 A more detailed discussion of how AIR influences payout profiles appears in Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009) . 16 Here the annuities are held in a non-tax qualified account and interest earnings are taxed as capital gains at a rate below the tax rate on labor earnings but higher than the Social Security tax rate (i.e. t r < t c < t l ). This is an approximation to the exclusion ratio approach implemented by the US tax authority adopted for computational simplicity; for more detail on annuity taxation; see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (1999) and Milevsky (2006) . The individual"s optimization problem is now to maximize the utility in (1) with respect to the appropriate asset allocation between liquid bonds and stocks, illiquid annuities, consumption/saving, leisure, and the retirement decision:
We rule out short-selling in stocks and bonds and preclude the household from borrowing against future labor, pension, and annuity income by imposing the non-negativity restrictions 
after ERA. For each grid point we evaluate the policy and value functions using Gaussian quadrature integration and cubic-spline interpolation.
Model Calibration
The individual"s lifespan is modeled from age 20 to 100 (T = 81). In our base case, preference parameters are set to standard values in the life cycle literature, namely a coefficient of relative risk aversion of ρ = 5 and a discount factor β = 0.97. The leisure preference value  is set equal to 0.59 in the base case, which is the mean of the agedependent profile used in Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva (2000) and close to Laitner"s (2003) The analysis also sets the mean equity log-return at µ s = 3.01% and the corresponding volatility parameter σ s = 19.34%, equivalent to a yearly expected gross real return of 1.05 and standard deviation of 20.5%; the assumed real riskless rate R f is 1.02, in line with current expectations. The deterministic component of the wage rate process follows Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2006) , reflective of middle-income households. The standard deviations N  and u  are equal to 10.95% and 13.89% (as reported in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005, and used by Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 2008) . The correlation between stock returns and permanent and transitory earnings shocks  n is set to zero, consistent with empirical evidence in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) . Returns on assets are assumed to be taxed at 20%; labor earnings are taxed at 30% following Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) . Housingrelated expenditures are modeled as in Gomes and Michaelides (2005) .
In the base case, we assume that the worker has a fixed labor supply of 8 hours per day and works 5 days a week (this is relaxed subsequently), motivated by Laitner (2003) is also set equal to the same fraction. The Social Security benefit structure is similar to that in effect in the United
States. The benefit replacement rate ζ is set to 0.55 as per Mitchell and Phillips (2006) ; the actuarial reduction rate for early retirement benefits is 0713 . 0 1  g and the delayed retirement crediting rate is 077 . 0 2  g as in Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva (2000) . Social Security benefits are taxed at a rate of 15% as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) . To price the annuities, the assumed interest rate is set to 2%, the insurance loading factor δ is 2.38% (in line with industry leaders such as Vanguard), and we use conditional survival probabilities a t p from the US 1996 female annuitant 2000 mortality table to account for potential adverse selection in the voluntary annuity market.
Results
In what follows, we present three variants of our model so as to compare key outcomes of interest including saving and investment patterns, annuitization purchases, work hours, and retirement ages. First, we develop a base case where the consumer can elect her retirement age endogenously but cannot adapt work hours per week and lacks access to annuities. Second, we allow work hours to be endogenous; and finally, we introduce annuities into the picture. To do so, we use the optimal feedback controls obtained from the stochastic optimization model and compute expectations using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters is provided in Section 2.4.
Fixed Hours, Flexible Retirement, No Annuity
We analyze a moderately risk-averse worker (ρ=5) whose chooses her appropriate consumption, investment, and labor supply strategy given a fixed workweek (i.e. 40-hour week work) but able to select a retirement age endogenously. Figure 1 traces expected consumption, labor income, and saving patterns by age, as well as the Cobb-Douglas function of leisure and consumption
which enters the utility function. All values are normalized by the worker"s first-year labor income. The results show that the household saves until age 47; liquid assets peak at age 55 in expectation when they amount to about eight times first-year labor income. Average labor income follows a hump-shaped pattern until age 65 and falls substantially when most households claim Social Security benefits at the endogenous retirement age. The consumption profile also drops sharply after age 65 and falls thereafter, since households are willing to trade off purchased goods for leisure time once this is feasible. Nevertheless, the Cobb-Douglas function F which combines consumption and leisure is quite smooth over the life cycle, as expected. Note that, in expectation, the individual would be anticipated to rationally exhaust her saving around the age of 80, relying fully on Social Security benefits after that. Figure 2 offers detailed insights into the household"s expected asset allocation patterns by age and retirement choices. Panel A in Figure 2 indicates that, in this environment, people will hold a very high fraction of their saving in stocks over the life cycle, conditional on having certain minimal level of saving. Even at age 80, the equity percent is still 97%. These equity fractions are considerably higher than reported in prior studies that do not allow endogenous retirement (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005; Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 2008 ). The reason is that, here, households react to adverse stock market developments by delaying retirement and saving more. Thus the inherent hedging possibility of labor supply allows the household to take on more financial risk until the oldest possible retirement age in our model, 70. Also Panel B shows that the capital market participation rate of modeled households decreases sharply with age; about half of the modeled households (55%) participate in the capital market at age 70; by age 80, fewer than 10% do so. Such high levels of equity holdings and low participation rates are actually not realistic for the older population. For instance, the U.S. Social Security Administration (2009) reports that about 55% of the 80+-population still receives income from assets which amounts to 10% of total income. Most of the asset income results from interest payments, and only one fifth receive any income from stocks. Therefore the model predicted market participation rates are low compared to observed behavior, and equity fractions, conditional on participation, seem high.
Figure 1 here
Figure 2 here
In Figure 3 we illustrate household work hours and retirement patterns. In this case, by assumption, the consumer works a 40-hour week work until retirement. As Panel A shows, labor supply patterns drop off as of the early retirement age of 62, and by age 66, all will have fully retired. Panel B displays the fraction of people electing to retire at each age: the model predicts that 14% will retire early, and the majority leaves at age 66. Next we allow the household to also choose its work intensity in the pre-retirement period, whereby the maximal labor supply is 2/3 of available time; in our case this is equivalent to a maximum of 75 working hours per week (i.e. 112*2/3). Results appear in Figure 4 , where we see that the household now saves much more than was true in Figure 1 .
Liquid assets now peak at earlier (at age 54 vs. 55 in Figure 1 ) and higher, amounting to over 10 times first-year labor income. On average, consumption is higher early in the work life and it falls after the normal retirement age; the function F is again smoothed over the life cycle.
Figure 4 here
Turning to equity market participation patterns, the patterns in Figure 5 are similar to those from Figure 2 : people still hold a surprisingly high fraction of their saving in stocks conditional on participation in the capital market (5A) but few households actually hold stocks and bonds after retirement (5B). Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 3 reveals much more striking differences. The individual able to adjust her labor hours ends up working much more during her younger years, and then she gradually curtails labor effort after middle age.
Essentially, she profits from working harder early in life, producing higher absolute saving and more capital market returns. Also, sharply different from the prior case, virtually all households work up to the normal retirement age; after that, households gradually reduce their working hours. Overall, endogenizing both the retirement age and work hours permits the consumer to enjoy reduced hours at older ages, a pattern consistent with empirical evidence (Low 2005) . Therefore our second model generates a relative realistic labor supply pattern, though predicted high equity holdings and low capital market participation patterns still appear inconsistent with observed behavior. In our third scenario, we allow the consumer to not only select her work intensity and retirement age, but also to hold annuities as well as stocks and bonds. Figure 7 shows the expected life cycle profiles for the case where payout annuities are available; in Panel A the consumer purchases fixed annuities, and in Panel B, variable annuities. The results show that saving levels in liquid stocks and bonds are lower than in the environment without annuities shown in Figure 4 . Now the consumer saves about 20% less at the peak of lifetime saving since she has the opportunity to purchase annuities and receive the survival credit in later life.
In the fixed annuity world, the worker will gradually purchase annuities between ages 48 and 75; the buying peaks at age 62 (when she spends about 13% of first-year labor income). Yet annuity payouts are not large, and in old age, people again live mainly on Social Security benefits. By contrast, in the variable annuity world, consumers buy substantial amounts of variable annuities from age 40 to 67, and the purchasing peaks at age 47 (now, at 190% of first-year labor income). Variable annuities then generate important levels of retirement income flows above and beyond Social Security benefits. The reason is that the illiquidity inherent in the variable annuity can be offset by flexibility in both working hours and the retirement age. Earlier purchases provide access to the survival credit and expected equity returns earlier in life.
Figure 8 here
Panels 1B and 2B of Figure 8 show the fraction of households not participating in the capital or annuity markets by age. While participation patterns by the young are virtually the same as before, there is a striking difference among the older population. Now most do not rely only on Social Security benefits; rather, they also receive income from purchased annuities. This is very clear in the case of variable annuities (2B), where virtually all retirees optimally annuitize a portion of their wealth. 
Figure 9 here
Overall, then, people retire earlier because they can secure a "second income" from their annuity purchases to supplement their Social Security benefits. In this case, endogenizing both work hours and retirement, and including annuities, the model generates hump-shaped work hour patterns, elderly equity holdings similar to those observed in the real world, and capital market participation patterns also consistent with empirical evidence.
Heterogeneity Analysis
To explore the heterogeneity in life cycle patterns, next we study consumption, savings, work effort, and portfolio behaviors for individuals who endogenously elect to retire early or late in life. Our goal is to better understand the interactions between exogenouslyrealized labor and capital market outcomes, and the household"s endogenously-chosen retirement age, work effort, and consumption/saving behavior. To do so, we select the settings where consumers have flexible work hours and access to the variable annuity markets. Figure   10 illustrates average consumption/saving patterns (10A and 10B), average wage rates (10C), average work effort (10D), and average realized stock returns (10E) computed only for consumer who chose to retire at age 62 (500 out of 10,000 samples) and 67 (4,160 out of 10,000 samples).
Figure 10 here
The graphs in Figure 10C and 10D show that individuals who retire late in life are those who generally experience a positive permanent wage rate shock early in life, and also have a relatively poor stock market experience. Higher wage rate paths of course produce higher Social Security benefits which provide stable retirement income streams, so individuals with higher wage rate paths work more 17 and retire later, to claim the delayed retirement credit. To compensate for later retirement and high work effort when young, these households also consume a lot and build up relatively little financial wealth; they buy annuities only later in life (10B). This can be explained by the fact that these households -due to their high labor income trajectories -expect relatively large social security benefits so they need not amass much wealth in stocks, bonds, and annuities.
By contrast, those who experience negative wage shocks early in life tend to work less and retire as early as possible. This is because such individuals compensate for their lower wage rates by taking more leisure earlier in life, and also by electing earlier retirement. For them, the credit from claiming later Social Security benefits is unattractive. Interestingly, households with low wage rate profiles, low work effort, and early retirement, also typically have above-average stock market performance (10D). They then can build up relatively higher financial wealth, and buy more/earlier annuities. Their main retirement income source is then payouts from private annuities with less coming from Social Security benefits. Hence high stock market returns lead households to retire early.
Welfare Analysis
Next we examine the impact on consumer welfare of adding labor supply flexibility and annuities to the opportunity set. 18 To do so, we show in Table 1 Table 1 here
Compared to the reference case, Row (1) shows that introducing flexible work hours prior to the fixed retirement age permits a utility increase of 5.9% (measured as consumptionequivalent) which is equivalent to a 59% gain in first-year labor earnings. Row (2) depicts the case of a worker who has fixed work hours but a flexible retirement age; this additional degree of freedom with respect to leisure provides a lifetime utility gain of 4.4%, which would be worth a 50% gain in first-year labor income. In Row (3), the worker can adapt both her work hours and her retirement age; relative to the reference case, utility gains are even larger, at almost 7% of lifetime utility, equivalent to more than a 60% increase in her firstyear labor income. Rows (4 and 5) permit both flexible hours and retirement ages; in (4) only fixed annuities are available, and in (5) variable annuities are also available. Here we see that utility gains rise further in a world with annuities where the annuity market is shut down; in the most flexible case, Row (5), lifetime utility rises by 7%.
In sum, the marginal benefit from having access to annuities is positive and important in the life cycle context, as is labor market flexibility in the form of adjustable weekly hours of work and retirement age. We note that these increases in lifetime utility are computed from the vantage point of a 20-year old where labor market flexibility is a driver for boosting forward-looking lifetime utility. Prior research has demonstrated that, for an individual on the verge of retirement, access to annuities is similarly valuable Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos 2009b) .
Sensitivity Analyses
To assess how robust our results might be to alternative formulations of household preferences, we next explore several alternative formulations of key utility parameters, namely risk aversion and the value attached to leisure. Of particular interest are the effects on labor supply, work hours, and retirement ages, summarized in Figure 11 and Table 2 . In addition, we evaluate the effects on asset allocation patterns and the likelihood of participating in the capital and annuity markets, reviewed in Tables 3 and 4 . In all instances, the benchmark (Case 1) is designed so the worker may elect flexible work hours and retirement age, and she also has access to stocks, bonds, and fixed payout annuities. Variants include Case (2) which boosts leisure preferences (to α=0.8); Case (3) reduces the consumer"s risk aversion (to and Case (4) where risk aversion is increased (to  In Case (5) we use a modified Cobb Douglas (MDC) utility function which alters the relative weights on consumption and leisure. Specifically, the argument of the utility function is specialized to
where α is set to 0.9 as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viciera (2008) . In Case (6) we make  agedependent to allow the utility of leisure to deteriorate with poorer health at older ages (as in Rust et al. 2000) . The leisure parameter (t) is given by =1-0.6/(1+t/50) where t is the period. In addition we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion to , a value in line with the economics literature. 20 In Case (7) we introduce a bequest motive.
Figure 11 and Tables 2-4 here
Not surprisingly, labor supply patterns over the life cycle depend importantly on the way in which the utility function is formulated in Figure 11 . In the benchmark case of Figure   11 , the average worker starts out working over 40 hours per week and in her mid-30"s she peaks at just under 50 hours per week; thereafter work hours fall gradually until retirement in her late 60"s. Everyone has retired after age 68 (Table 2) . By contrast, the leisure-lover (Case 2) works only about half-time over her entire worklife and leaves employment as early as possible; all such persons are fully retired by age 63. Work hours in Cases 3, 4, and 7 are quite similar to those in the benchmark case, indicating that varying risk aversion or introducing bequest motive do not much influence hours. Yet there are substantially different retirement age outcomes: the most risk-averse consumer is also likely to work until forced out at age 70, whereas risk lovers have a more dispersed retirement age distribution; the consumer who has bequest prefers to retire early ( Table 2 ). The pattern for Case 5 results in an unrealistically high level of work effort over the life cycle, in that young and middle-aged employees are predicted to work over 60 hours per week and must be forced to retire at age 70. Finally, Case 6 with the age-dependent utility of leisure parameter results in young persons are taking on extremely high labor hour commitments, but their effort drops off as health problems set in.
Additionally they are likely to retire early, with the withdrawal pattern peaking at age 62.
The portfolio implications of this robustness analysis are summarized in Tables 3 and   4 . For instance, the leisure lovers (those who worked relatively little during their youth) also tend to invest heavily in equity until late in life (Tables 3 and 4 , Case 2). Those with lower levels of risk aversion are, not surprisingly, much more likely to invest in equity and virtually all are in the capital market even at older ages (Tables 3 and 4 , Case 3); the natural comparison is with the highly risk averse consumer in Case 4 who exits equities in favor of annuities at a much younger age. In Case 5, the asset allocation pattern seems quite reasonable: the worker starts with a high equity allocation and gradually moves into safer investments like bonds and annuities with age. We also note in Table 4 that this consumer has a high probability of participating in the financial market. Yet this seemingly realistic life cycle investment pattern stands in contrast to the unrealistically high and long worklife profile noted above, for this specification of preferences. Case 6 investment patterns are more consistent with priors, in that equity holdings are high for the young; during their 50"s, the 21 The value equation (1) with a bequest motive becomes
whereby b is the bequest strength and
. is the available bequest wealth.
consumer is expected to switch into bonds and annuities and by age 65 to hold virtually no risky assets. But now the work patterns are more realistic than the prior case, since effort drops off with age as health deteriorates and they also retire early. In addition, the retirement peak at age 62 is also quite realistic (Table 2) . 22 The same retirement peak is shown in Case (7) with bequest strength of two. The liquid saving patterns follow bequest wealth. Thus a consumer with a bequest motive must save more and invest more in the equity market so that she can attain a certain level of bequest. Moreover, the high saving allows the consumer to retire early.
Conclusions
We use a realistically calibrated life-cycle model to derive optimal work and retirement behavior, as well as consumption and investment strategy, taking into account stocks, bonds, and payout annuities. Prior portfolio allocation studies assume that the retirement age is set exogenously and predict that older people will hold unrealistically high levels of equity. Yet using prior studies" parameters, we show that few older persons will actually participate in the capital market at all, also incompatible with real-world evidence.
Making labor supply endogenous raises older persons" equity share and substantially increases work effort of the young; it also affords significant lifetime welfare gains of 7% or more than 60% of first-year earnings. Introducing annuities then generates even more realistic models which permit earlier retirement and higher participation by the elderly in financial markets. Finally, our model with an age-dependent leisure preference parameter fits observed behavior remarkably well, incorporating a gradual decline in work hours and equity holdings with age, as well as a sensible dispersion in retirement ages which peak at age 62, consistent with the evidence. We also find that individuals work more hours if they receive a positive permanent wage rate shock relatively early in life, consistent with previous studies. Our findings also show that individuals having flexibility in their labor supply decision and access to annuity market, who experience positive labor market shocks and poor stock market surprises work more at younger ages, buy more annuities, and retire early.
In sum, combining work, investment, and lifetime payouts offers better and more attractive ways to manage life"s many challenges. This is one reason that, though fixed payout annuities have been more prevalent in the marketplace to date, we anticipate investmentlinked payout annuities will become more popular as Baby Boomers age. (1) is the reference case with a Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility function where α equals 0.59 and ρ is 5. Case (2) has  set at 0.8, i.e. the investor prefers to have much more leisure time. For Case (3), the investor becomes less risk-averse so ρ is 3, and more risk averse in Case (4) where ρ is 10. In Case (5) we use a modified Cobb-Douglas (MCD) with α set at 0.9 to capture a stronger leisure preference. For Case (6) we use an age-dependent  to allow for a gradual decline in the utility of leisure associated with poorer health at older ages; as in Buchinski et al. (2000) . (t) is given by =1-0.6/(1+t/50), where t is the period. Case (7) assumes the investor has a bequest motive (with b = 2). Notes: See Figure 7 . (1) (2) (3) (4) 
